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CHAPTER 7
Natural and Unnatural Use in Romans 1:24-27: 
Paul and the Philosophic Critique of Eros
DAVID E. FREDRICKSON
Wherefore God delivered them to the desires of their hearts for the 
purpose of impurity, for their bodies to be dishonored among them 
—  they who exchanged the truth of God for a lie and reverenced and 
worshiped the creation rather than the creator, who is blessed for 
ever, amen. Because of this, God delivered them to dishonoring pas­
sions. Their females exchanged natural use for that which is beyond 
nature. Likewise, the males left off the natural use of the female and 
were inflamed for one another in their appetite, males among males 
producing disgrace and receiving back in themselves the punishment 
which was necessary from their error.
Romans 1:24-27
Or do you not know that the unjust will not inherit the kingly rule of 
God? Do not be led astray. Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor 
adulterers, nor those who lack self-control, nor the arrogant who 
penetrate boys, nor thieves, nor those who get more than their fair 
share, nor dissolute and rowdy drinkers, nor revilers, nor robbers will 
inherit the kingly rule of God. 1
1 C o r in th ia n s  6 :9 -1 0
David E. Fredrickson
A. Introduction
To say there is no uniformity in the ways of studying the topic of sex in an­
cient texts is an understatem ent. Some scholars have insisted on the 
transhistorical validity of homosexuality and heterosexuality. They believe 
that ancient texts share the m odern interest in knowing, classifying, and eval­
uating sexual orientation . 1 O ther scholars have amplified and refined the ba­
sic insights of Kenneth Dover and Michel Foucault, summarized by Mark 
Golden, “that forms of sexual activity were not a major concern, that hom o­
sexual and heterosexual desire were regarded as identical, that excess (failing 
to control oneself) and passivity (falling under another’s control) were the 
main forms of sexual immorality for m en .”2
The Dover/Foucault framework informs this paper, which first treats 
Romans 1:24-27 at considerable length, moving at the end to a brief examina­
tion of 1 Corinthians 6:9.3 My guiding question is this: How do the ways of
1. Authors with divergent opinions about the morality o f  sam e-sex love still share 
these assumptions. For example, it is interesting to compare the work o f  J. Boswell with 
J. De Young, “The Source and NT M eaning o f  ARSENOKOITAI, with Implications for 
Christian Ethics and Ministry,” M a s te r ’s  S e m in a r y  J o u rn a l 3 (1992): 191-215.
2. Mark Golden, “Thirteen Years o f  Hom osexuality (and Other Recent Work on  
Sex, Gender and the Body in Ancient Greece),” E chos d u  M o n d e  C la ss iq tie  35 (1991): 334. 
For a statement o f  the Dover/Foucault trajectory by one o f  its best representatives, see 
D. Halperin, “Historicizing the Sexual Body: Sexual Preferences and Erotic Identities in 
the Pseudo-Lucianic E rd tes ,” in D isc o u rse s  o f  S e x u a lity :  F rom  A r is to t le  to  A I D S , ed. 
D. Stanton (Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 236-61. The m ost signifi­
cant refinements are found in D. Cohen, L aw , S ex u a lity , a n d  S ocie ty : T h e E n fo rcem en t o f  
M o ra ls  in  C lassica l A th e n s  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Cohen, “Sexu­
ality, Violence, and the Athenian Law o f Hubris,” G reece a n d  R o m e  38 (1991): 171-88; and 
A. Richlin, “N ot before Homosexuality: The Materiality o f  the C in a ed u s  and the Roman 
Law against Love between Men,” Jou rn a l o f  th e  H is to r y  o f  S e x u a lity  3 (1993): 523-73. They 
raise doubts about the first point, that the form o f  sexual activity was not a matter o f  con­
cern. Given the accuracy o f  the third point, the first had inevitably to com e under scrutiny.
, The second point (the unity o f  desire) was recognized early on by J. Henderson ( T h e  
M a c u la te  M u se: O b scen e  L an gu age  in  A tt ic  C o m e d y  [New York: Yale University Press, 
1975], pp. 52-53) and has stood the test o f  time.
3. D. Martin ("Heterosexism and the Interpretation o f  Romans 1:18-32,” B ib lica l  
I n te r p r e ta tio n  3 [1995]: 332-55) has'anticipated som e o f  the arguments below. Martin’s 
legitim ate concern for “ideological analysis o f  m odern scholarship on Rom. 1:18-32” 
does not, however, allow him  the opportunity to develop the philosophic background in 
as great detail as offered here. Nevertheless, his critique (pp. 333-39) o f  the traditional 
interpretation that the creation story in Genesis is the proper background o f  Paul’s ar­
gum ent is brilliant and com plem ents m y attempt to place Paul in his contem porary in­
tellectual environm ent. J, Fitzmyer (R o m a n s , Anchor Bible 33 [New York: Doubleday,
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conceptualizing sexual matters in Paul’s philosophic and literary environ­
ment help us make sense of his argument? I will conclude that these Pauline 
texts are not about the condemnation of homosexuality. Rather, in Romans 
1:24-27 Paul points to the problem of passion without introducing the m od­
ern dichotomy of homo/heterosexuality. In 1 Corinthians 6:9 the term “soft” 
refers to lack o f self-control (not the boy prostitute) and dpaevoKoirng is the 
hybristic pederast whose vice is not misplaced desire but injustice. Obviously, 
these are not new conclusions about these texts. W hat I hope to offer are ad­
ditional reasons to believe that they are true.
B. What Does “Natural Use” Mean?
My guiding question presumes that Paul’s language about sex has m uch in 
common with the erotic discourse of his contemporaries and that interpret­
ers must take this overlap seriously. One im portant point of contact between 
Paul and his intellectual environment is the notion of sexual activity as use 
(Xprjoig) .* 4 Interpreters of Romans 1:24-27 have been remarkably incurious 
about this term. Most assume that it means “relation” or “intercourse” and 
quickly pass it by on the way to more interesting terminology such as “na­
ture.” This is unfortunate, because “relation” imports the modern notion that 
sex is (or should be) a matter of mutuality. The texts collected and discussed 
below will demonstrate that xpfjmc; does not refer to a relation carried out in 
the medium of sexual pleasure but the activity of the desiring subject, usually 
male, performed on the desired object, female or male.5
The fact that sexual desire and hunger were thought to be analogous 
alerts us to the way that the very concept of relation distorts Paul’s argu-
1993], pp. 274-77) is also critical o f  reading too m uch o f  Genesis into Rom. 1:18-32, but 
he fails to carry through on this insight and makes the mistake o f  regarding 1:24-27 as 
the reason for God’s wrath.
4. Sex as use is a building block in Foucault’s description o f  the Greek “moral 
problematization o f  sexual conduct.” See T h e H is to r y  o f  S ex u a lity , vol. 2, T h e  U se o f  P le a ­
su re  (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 53-62.
5. The only exception I have been able to discover is Chariton, C h o rea s  a n d  C a llirh o e  
2.8.4. For the new idea in the romances o f  both partners enjoying sex, see D. Konstan, S ex ­
u a l S y m m e try :  L o ve  in  th e  A n c ie n t N o v e l a n d  R e la te d  G en res (Princeton: Princeton Univer­
sity Press, 1994). For enjoym ent (dordAauatg) —  a term som etim es coordinated with 
Xptjoig —  shared between male and female lovers and asserted not to be possible in peder­
asty, see Ps.-Lucian, A ffa irs  o f  th e  H e a r t  27.
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m ent.6 This analogy becomes even more significant when texts are taken into 
account which assert a similarity between the use of sex and the use of food .7 
Aristippus, whose sexual activity with Lais occurred w ithout her loving 
(<|)iXoi5ar|<;) him, is paraphrased by Plutarch: “He didn’t imagine, he said, that 
wine or fish loved him either, yet he used both with pleasure (f|5 ei0(; EKarepw 
XPHtai).”8 This remark reflects more than an errant philosopher’s machismo. 
In it we see the pervasive interpretation of sexual activity as use.9 The analogy 
of sex with food furthermore helped to define sexual norms, since the plea­
sure of sex, it was argued, needs to be limited by satisfaction just as a full 
stomach limits eating .10
In order to distinguish modern and ancient ways of thinking about sex, 
it is worth underscoring that neither the gender of the subject nor that of the 
object is material to the concept of use. Frequently, as in the case of Romans 
1:27, the term refers to the husband’s sexual activity with respect to the wife, 11 
though this does not mean that xpfjatc; is invariably associated with a hus- 
band/wife or, for that matter, a male/female pairing .12 Epictetus’s advice
6. For gptog as an appetite like hunger or thirst, see D. Halperin, “Platonic E ros and 
What Men Call Love,” A n c ie n t P h ilo so p h y  5 (1985): 164-66, and D. Brown, L u cre tiu s on  
L ove a n d  Sex: A  C o m m e n ta r y  on  “D e  R e ru m  N a tu r a ” IV, w ith  P ro legom en a , Text, a n d  T rans­
la tio n  (Leiden: Brill, 1987), pp. 231-33.
7. Henderson, p. 47.
8. Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  750D-E. (Unless otherwise indicated, translations are from 
the Loeb Classical Library; translation m odified in this instance). For the concept o f  use in 
Aristippus’s treatment o f  pleasure, see Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.17.17; Diogenes Laertius, 
L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  2.75.
9. For the correlation o f  using food and using sex, see Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.9.46; 
M usonius Rufus, F ra g m en t 16; Epictetus, D iscou rse  2.8.12; Galen, O n  th e  D o c tr in e s  o f  H ip ­
p o cra te s  a n d  P la to  5.7.21-25.
10. Clement o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s 2.10.90.2-3 (translation is S. P. Wood, C le m ­
e n t o f  A lex a n d r ia :  C h r is t th e E du cator, FC 23 [New York: Fathers o f the Church, 1954], 
p. 169): “We should consider boys as our sons, and the wives o f  other men as our daugh­
ters. We must keep a firm control over the pleasures o f the stomach, and an absolutely un­
com promising control over the organs beneath the stom ach.. . .  In lawful wedlock, as with 
eating, nature permits whatever is conformable to nature and helpful and decent; it allows 
us to desire the act o f procreation. However, whoever is guilty o f  excess (u[!ep(loXi)v) sins 
against nature and, by violating the laws regulating intercourse, harms himself.” Cf. 
Xenophon, S y m p o s iu m  8.15; Philo, S p ecia l L a w s  3.9; Plutarch, A d v ic e  a b o u t K e ep in g  W ell 
124E-125A; O n  th e  E a tin g  o f  Flesh, II, 997B.
11. Clement o f Alexandria, S tro m a te is  3.11.71.4: cwtjjpdvwg 6f3ot5XeTO Tong yaperaTg 
XPhaOat tout; avbpag 6  vdgog teal dnl pdvp TTatbojtoiiqi; Justin Martyr, D ia lo g u s cu m  
T ry p h o n e  Ju daeo  110: p6 vp tp yapETp yuvaixl &eaarog xp^pevot; Athenagoras, L ega tio  
32.1: yuvaixl 5£ Tp i5ia &6eX<|>p xpd>pevov.
12. K. Preston, S tu d ie s  in th e D ic tio n  o f  th e S erm o  A m a to r iu s  in  R o m a n  C o m e d y
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about casual affairs illustrates male use of the female outside of marriage: “In 
your sex-life preserve purity, as far as you can, before marriage, and, if you in­
dulge, take only those privileges which are lawful. However, do not make 
yourself offensive, or censorious, to those who do indulge (xpwp£voi<;), and 
do not make frequent mention of the fact that you yourself do not indulge 
(XPP) ” * 13 Rarer than the male’s use of the female are instances of the wife’s use 
of the husband , 14 to which Paul most likely alludes in Romans 1:26: “their fe­
males exchanged natural use for that which is against nature (rfjv (j)uaiKf)V 
Xpfjoiv eiq Tf)v nap& <|)i3aiv).” 15 The paucity of examples of the female’s use of 
the male can be explained in part by the lack of attention paid by male au­
thors to female sexual experience and also by their reluctance to think of 
women as users, a male social role.
The m etaphor of use in sexual matters does not in itself raise the issue 
of the gender of the persons involved. Thus, parallel to the husband’s use of 
the wife, we find that pederasty was routinely conceptualized in terms o f the 
use to which 6  6pocorng (the lover) put 6  £pt6pevo<; (the boy loved) . 16 Peder-
(Chicago: University o f  Chicago Libraries, 1916), p. 30: “These two verbs [nfor and f r u o r ] 
are practically interchangeable, as are their Greek equivalents [xpwpai and ArroXAuco], 
though in the case o f  fruor and ArroXauw m ore zest is perhaps implied. Utor is in effect 
rather neutral, formal, and reminiscent o f  legal phraseology.” Cf. Seneca, O n  th e  H a p p y  
L ife  10.3. See also J. N. Adams, T h e  L a tin  S ex u a l V o ca b u la ry  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982), pp. 189, 198; Brown, pp. 219, 234, 239. For the sexual sense o f  
Xpfjaiq in medical writers, see L. Dean-Jones, “The Politics o f  Pleasure: Female Sexual Ap­
petite in the Hippocratic Corpus,” in D iscou rses o f  S ex u a lity , p. 57.
13. Epictetus, E n ch e ir id io n  33.8. Cf. D iogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  
2.74; 7.131; D io Cassius, R o m a n  H is to r y  54.16.3-5; Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  751B; 
G n o m o lo g iu m  V aticanurn  376; Ps.-Lucian, T h e A ss  51.
14. Plutarch, A d v ic e  to  B r id e  a n d  G ro o m  144B. See also Brown, p. 308.
1 5 .1 have been unable to discover any examples o f  “use” in descriptions o f  female 
sexual activity with females. This suggests that Paul is not alluding to lesbianism in 1:26, as 
many exegetes assume; rather the reference is to inordinate desire within marriage. Other 
insights confirm this. B. Brooten (“Patristic Interpretations o f Romans 1:26,” in S tu d ia  
P a tr is tica  X V III, vol. 1 [Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1985], pp. 287-91) cites pa­
tristic readings which do not assume lesbianism, and J. Miller (“The Practices o f  Romans 
1:26: Homosexual or Heterosexual?” N o v T  37 [1995]: 4-8, 10) argues persuasively that 
only when the categories o f  hom o/heterosexuality are assumed does 1:26 appear to speak 
o f  females having sex with females.
16. Aristippus (in Diogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  2.99): “The wise 
man will use boys (Toig £pwp£voig xpqoeoOai) openly and without any regard to circum ­
stance.” On this passage, see G. Gerhard, P h o in ix  vo n  K o lo p h o n  (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909), 
pp. 145-46. Similar term inology is attributed to Zeno at S to ico ru m  V e te ru m  F rag tn en ta  
1.59.30: m l  tot? jtou5ikoTc; XPO0 ^ '  ^KtoXurtog. See also Athenaeus, D e ip n o so p h is ta e  
13.604D-E; Fronto, E pist. G raecae  8.7.
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asty was spoken o f as “using the male as a woman .” 17 This indicates the earlier 
place of the m etaphor in the husband’s sexual use of the wife, but such prior­
ity did not imply male/female pairing as a norm. Indifference to gender is 
seen most clearly when xpnoi? (or its cognates) refers in the same passage to 
the male’s use of males and females. Reporting on the dissolute life of 
Sardanapallus, Diodorus o f Sicily points to the king’s pursuit of “the delights 
of love with men as well as with women, for he practiced sexual indulgence of 
both kinds without restraint (£xpfFO Y&p to\q in ’ ouvouoioug
6cv£5r|v).” 18 From Diodorus’s perspective, Sardanapallus’s fault was not his 
choice of sexual objects but the unrestrained manner in which he pursued his 
desires.
So far we have seen that xpflotq emphasizes the instrumentality of the 
object of sexual desire and does not draw particular attention to the gender of 
the persons involved. Where does this conceptualization of sexual activity, so 
foreign to m odern thinking about sex as a relation, originate? We have seen 
above that the analogy between eating and having sex was widespread. This is 
one possible source. Another im portant background is the topic of house­
hold management (oixovopia) . 19 Use of possessions is a practical task for the 
head of the household .20 One theorist aligns use with acquiring, preserving, 
and improving property .21 The more common division of the topic is simply 
possession (KTqotg) and use (xprjotg) of property .22 The Pythagorean 
Callicratidas employs this division: “But of the parts of a family there are two 
first and greatest divisions: viz. man and possessions (Ktaoiq), the latter of 
which is a thing governed, and affords utility (xpaoiv). Thus, also, the first 
and greatest parts of an animal are soul and body; and soul, indeed, is that
17. Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.30: yuvai^l role &v8 p6 ai xpwp^vq. Cf. D io Cassius, 
Roman History 62.28.3; Lucian, A True Story 1.22.3-4; Ps.-Lucian, Affairs o f the Heart 27.
18. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 2.23.2. Cf. Xenophon, Symposium 8.28-29; 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f Eminent Philosophers 10.132; Epictetus, Encheiridion 10; Ps.- 
Lucian, Affairs of the Heart 25.
19. Foucault has drawn attention to male sexual practice as a problem o f  household  
management. See especially The Use of Pleasure, pp. 141-84.
20. See, for example, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 3.159.6.
21. Ps.-Aristotle, Oeconomica 1.6.1: “There are four qualities which the head o f  a 
household must possess in dealing w ith his property. . .  acquiring (ktSoOcu) . . .  preserv­
ing (<j>uAdrrciv). . .  how to improve (Koapqrucbv), and how  to make use o f  it (xpqoriKdv).” 
For the last in this list, see S. Pomeroy, Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical 
Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 219-20.
22. Plato, Euthydemus 280E; Clement o f  Alexandria, Paedagogus 2.3.38.4r3.8.41.3; 
Stromateis 6.12.100.1; Iamblichus, Protrepticus 37. For a fuller collection o f  philosophic 
texts displaying this organization o f  the topic, see Gerhard, pp. 113-15.
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which governs and uses (xpeojUEVOv), but the body is that which is governed 
and imparts utility (xpaaiv).”23 Wives fall within the category o f things to be 
used, though sexual use specifically is not mentioned by these authors .24
A significant issue in household management was the matter of correct 
use (6p0f| xptjtfi?)-25 It depended on employing «5id4>opa (matters of indiffer­
ence) without passion, as Clement of Alexandria emphasized in his discussion 
of the Christian’s relation to wealth: “So let a man do away, not with posses­
sions, but rather with the passions of the soul, which do not consent to the 
better use (rf|v Apdvco XPnmv) of what he has; in order that, by becoming noble 
and good, he may be able to use these possessions also in a noble manner (rolg 
KT^pacn xprjaGca 8uvr|0f) KocXtog).”26 Control of passions, if not their complete 
eradication for some authors, is the path to correct use of possessions.27
Broadening the investigation beyond the limits of the topos on house­
hold management, we discover a drive, particularly among Stoics (by no 
means limited to them, however), to articulate the correct use of externals in 
all areas of life. Correct use is a component in the chief doctrine of the philos­
ophers according to Epictetus’s understanding of Zeno’s maxim: ‘“ To follow 
the gods is man’s end, and the essence of the good is the correct use (xpfjai? 
o'la 5ei) of external impressions.’ ”28 In Stoic doctrine the happiness of the
23. Text is H. Thesleff, T h e  P y th a g o r e a n  T ex ts o f  th e  H e lle n is tic  P erio d , Acta 
Academiae Aboensis, Ser. A, vol. 30 (Abo: Abo Akademi, 1965), 104.7-11. Translation is 
T. Taylor, P o litica l F ra g m en ts o fA rc h y ta s , C h a ro n d a s, Z a leu ca s, a n d  O th e r  A n c ie n t  P y th a g o ­
reans  (Chiswick: Taylor, 1822), p. 51.
24. Xenophon, O eco tio m icu s  3.10; S y m p o s iu m  2.10; Philo, O n  V ir tu es  30.
25. Plato, E u th yd em u s  280E; R e p u b lic  451C: “right possession and use o f  children 
and wives (6p0f| 7ra(6tov re ical yuvaiKiSv Krfjaig re teal xpela).” See also Ps.-Plato, E ryx ias  
403B. In a summary o f  Aristotelian ethical doctrine (Ps.-Aristotle, D e  v ir tu t ib u s  e t  v itiis )  
preserved in Stobaeus, one o f  the “works o f  prudence” is “to use well all existing goods (t6  
XprjoOat KaXwc naai roTg UJtdpxouaiv AyaOoig, Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.140.3-4).” On the 
other hand, a characteristic work o f  foolishness is “to use existing goods in a bad way (t6  
XprjoOai Kaxtog roTg trapoOcnv AyaOoTg, Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.143, 19-20).” See further 
Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.264.12-265.4; Iamblichus, P ro tre p ticu s  25-28. For “just use (SiKat'a 
Xpfjatg),” see Theano, E p is tle  6.2 (Thesleff, 197.34).
26. Clement o f  Alexandria, Q u is  d iv e s  s a lv e tu r  14. Cf. S tro m a te is  3.1.4.2; P aedagogu s  
2.1.9.2; Seneca, E p is tle  74.18.
27. Clement o f  Alexandria, Q u is  d iv e s  s a lv e tu r  15: “A man must say good-bye, then, 
to the injurious things he has, not to those that can actually contribute to his advantage if  
he knows the right use o f  them  (rtjv 6p0rjv xpfjoiv); and advantage com es from those that 
are managed (otKOVOpoupcva) with wisdom , m oderation and piety.”
28. Epictetus, D isco u rse  1.20.15-16. For Zeno on xpnmc, see also S to ico ru m  V e teru m  
F ra g m en ta  1.57.17-24. For Epictetus’s sustained interest in the moral problem o f  using ex­
ternals, see D isco u rse s  1.28.6-7, 12; 2.16.28; 4.5.23; F r a g m e n ts ,  E n ch e ir id io n  6.
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sage could be attributed to the use of matters of indifference for benefit — 
not for pleasure.29 While the sage “consistently uses (xpt&psvoq Guve/dx;)” the 
experiences of life “prudently, with self-control, decently, and orderly 
(cjipovi'pwc; ra l ^Kpaicog ra t  Koopftoc; ra \  eut&ktwc;),” the bad person fails to 
understand 6p0t) xpqoig and necessarily lives a life of regret.30 Correct use of 
any object requires the control of passion. The wise man will “feel no attrac­
tion or confusion in treating (xpfjasTou) the things from which the passions 
spring, like wealth and poverty, glory and ingloriousness, health and disease, 
life and death, trouble and pleasure. To use indifferently things which are 
matters of ethical indifference (6t5toccj)6ptoc; TOig &8 ta(|)6 pcug XPnnwpsOa) we 
need considerable powers of discrimination. . . .”31 Correct use is measured 
use of objects necessary for life and the strict avoidance of luxury.32 The use 
of sexual objects was similarly evaluated in terms of control of passion .33 
Using sex sparingly was the ideal.34
We have now come to the point where the philosophic view of correct 
use points the way to an interpretation of Romans 1:26-27. The philosophers 
had one more synonym of correct use; it was the very phrase which Paul em­
ploys —  natural use (c|)UOiKij xpnoig). Natural use is characterized by an 
avoidance of luxury and the control of passion .35 According to Epictetus, “the
29. Diogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  7.104. N ote here the Stoic for­
mula eu real icaicwg xPn°0a 0 good use makes som ething indifferent good: see S to ico ru m  
V ete ru m  F ra g m en ta  3.20.6; 3.29.28; 3.29.41-42; 3.49.23-29. This notion is reflected in 
Epictetus (D isc o u rse  2.6.2): “Although life is a matter o f  indifference, the use which you 
make o f  it is not a matter o f  indifference (ofrrwg t6 tflv &8(6<j>opov, f| xprjoig ouk 
«5i<j((])opog).” Cf. 3.3.2. For use aiming in benefit rather than in pleasure, see Galen, O n  th e  
D o c tr in e s  o f  H ip p o c ra te s  a n d  P la to  4.2.42 (text and translation is P. De Lacy, G a len  o n  th e  
D o c tr in e s  o f  H ip p o c ra te s  a n d  P la to , 2nd ed. [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981], pp. 246-47): 
“When a person is led by reason alone to the experience (xpnoiv) o f  pleasant things, such a 
person is called temperate (aux|)ptov), for he has made his aim in choosing them  not the 
enjoyment (d7r6Aaoaiv) but the benefit (tb(j>6Aiav).”
30. Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  2.102.20-25. Cf. Ps.-Crates, E pistle  10; Plutarch, O n  T ran ­
q u il i ty  o f  M in d  466C.
31. Clement o f Alexandria, S tro m a te is  2.109.3-4 (translation is J. Ferguson, C le m e n t  
o f  A lex a n d r ia :  “S tro m a te is” B ooks O n e  to  Three, FC 85 [Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univer­
sity o f  America Press, 1991], p. 229). Cf. P aedagogu s  2.12.121.1: xwpfg n p o o n a O e ia q  xal 
5ia<|>op«g xpwpeOa auToig.
32. Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  2.127.11-25; 135.5-10; 136.3-8; M usonius Rufus, F ra g m en t  
18B; Clement o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s  2.1.12.1; 2.12.120.5-6.
33. Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.360.6-21.
34. Clement o f Alexandria, S tro m a te is  4.23.147.1; Ocellus, On th e  N a tu r e  o f  th e  U n i­
verse  54-55; Aristoxenus (in Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  4.879.8).
35. Seneca, O n  th e  H a p p y  L ife  17.2: n a tu ra lis  usus.
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function of the good and excellent man is to deal with his impressions in ac­
cordance with nature ( t6  xpijoQou raiq (^avraaiaig Kara <|)uoiv).”36 On the 
other hand, careless use of externals, that is, when passion is present, is naptx 
(j)i3oiv.37
So far we have located the Pauline argument within the ethical problem 
of the correct, or natural, use of externals. Paul is not condemning homosex­
ual relations as such; the notion of sexual relation is itself foreign to his way 
of thinking. We have seen that xptjoN, properly understood as use, entails a 
completely different moral problem than the one implied by xpn°N mistak­
enly translated as relation. xpijotg does not make gender thematic. Rather, the 
problem becomes the psychological significance of the act for the subject of i| 
sexual desire. We are able to confirm this interpretation when we turn  from 
an analysis of use and explore further the concept of nature in the philo­
sophic treatments of passion in general and sexual desire in particular. We 
will find a connection between “against nature” and the notion of the normal, 
acquisitive aspect of the self’s relation to the world given over to excess.
On this point I am in agreement with Dale Martin, who has suggested 
that what Paul meant by napix <|)uaiv was not “disoriented desire” but “ inordi­
nate desire.”38 M artin’s work has made it clear that we need a more differenti­
ated sense of what “according to nature” meant in the ancient world when it 
came to matters of sex. Natural sex was understood in three distinct ways: sex \  
for the sake of procreation (thus only male with female);39 sex which symbol­
izes and preserves male social superiority to the female (males penetrate/fe- 
males are penetrated);40 and sex in which passion is absent or at least held to a
36. Epictetus, D isco u rse  3.3.2. Cf. D isco u rse s  3.16.15; 4.5.23; 4.10.26; F ra g m en t 4; 
E n ch e ir id io n  6.
37. Epictetus, D isco u rse  3.3.2, 3, 6, 24.
38. Martin, p. 342 (emphasis Martin’s).
39. Plato, L a w s  838D-839A; Ocellus, O n  th e  N a tu r e  o f  th e  U n iverse  44-45, 55; 
M usonius Rufus, F ra g m en t 12; Philo, S p ec ia l L a w s  3.34-36; D io Chrysostom, D isc o u rse  
7.136; Clement o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s  2.10.87.1-4. The naturalness o f  sex for procre­
ation is rejected in Ps.-Diogenes, E pistle  21. For an attempt to read “against nature” as 
nonvaginal sex into Rom. 1:24-27, see Miller, pp. 8-11.
40. Philo, A b ra h a m  135-36; S p ecia l L a w s  1.325; 2.50; 3.39; O n  th e  C o n te m p la tiv e  Life 
59; Dio Chrysostom, D iscou rse  7.149; Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  750D-E; 751C-D; Ps.-Lucian, A f­
fa ir s  o f  th e H e a r t 19-20 (on which see S. Goldhill, F o u ca u lt’s V irg in ity : A n c ie n t E ro tic  F iction  
a n d  th e H is to r y  o f  S ex u a lity  [Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1995], p. 105); Clem ­
ent o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s 2.10.90.2-3; 3.3.23.1; G reek A n th o lo g y  11.272; Seneca, E pistle  
95.20-21. Discussion o f  sex as symbolic o f  social power must begin with K. Dover, G reek H o ­
m o se x u a lity  (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 100-109. Artcmidorus’s 
dream analysis has been highly prized as a way into Greco-Roman attitudes toward sex. For
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minimum. Significant for our interpretation of Romans 1:24-27 is the fact 
that only the last of these is coordinated in ancient texts with the concept of 
use.41 By combining “use” with “natural,” Paul follows a pattern established 
by the moral philosophers whose concern was to make passion and its control 
the core ethical problem in all matters of life.
The mutual implication of passion and “against nature” is basic to the 
Stoic evaluation of action. Diogenes Laertius reports that “passion, or emo­
tion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, 
or again as impulse in excess.”42 W hat makes an action wrong and against na­
ture is the presence of passion in the agent.43 Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and 
Seneca provide copious references to nature in descriptions of the ideal life 
spent in pursuing necessities without indulging passion .44 The association of 
the unnatural with passion is not limited to Stoics.45
his understanding o f  natural sex as sym bolic o f  male dom ination o f  the female, see 
J. Winkler, T h e  C o n s tra in ts  o f  D esire: E ssays in  th e A n th ro p o lo g y  o f  S ex  a n d  G en d er  in  A n c ie n t  
G reece (N ew  York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 36-37. This approach, which highlights the dim en­
s io n  o f  power in sexuality, has been employed fruitfully in the explanation o f  Jewish and rab­
binic condem nation o f male-with-male sexual activity. See M. Satlow, “‘They Abused Him  
Like a W oman’: Homoeroticism, Gender Blurring, and the Rabbis in Late Antiquity,” Jou rn al 
o f  th e  H is to r y  o f  S e x u a lity  5 (1994): 1-25; D. Boyarin, “Are There Any Jews in ‘The History o f  
Sexuality’?” Jou rn a l o f  th e  H is to r y  o f  S ex u a lity  5 (1995): 333-55.
41. The only possible exception I have discovered is Athenaeus, D e ip n o so p h is ta e  
13.605D: “So beware, you philosophers who indulge in passion contrary to nature (ol 
n a pix cj)i3aiv rf) A<j>po5fTr) yp^ i1^ 01) ” Yet this is a difficult text. The context is certain phi­
losophers’ pederastic practice. In 13.605E the philosophers’ problem is not knowing that 
desire is transitory. Similarly, the boy’s beauty com es to an end, while the philosophers’ 
passion does not cease. M ight “against nature” here mean the im possibility o f  fulfilling de­
sires?
42. Diogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  7.110. ji&Ooc; is by definition  
against nature. That which makes it so is excess o f  rational im pulse toward objects. See the 
convenient collection o f  texts in A. Glibert-Thirry, P seu d o -A n d ro n icu s  d e  R h odes: ITEPI 
T IA 0D N , Corpus Latinum Com m entariorum  in Aristotelem Graecorum,Suppl. 2 (Leiden: 
Brill, 1977), pp. 273-74. For an illum inating discussion o f  this topic, see B. Inwood, E th ics  
a n d  H u m a n  A c tio n  in  E a r ly  S to ic ism  (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), pp. 154-73.
43. Representative is Clem ent o f  Alexandria, S tro m a te is  2.109.1. See G. B. Kerford, 
“The Origin o f  Evil in Stoic Thought,” B u lle tin  o f  th e  John R y la n d s  L ib r a ry  60 (1978): 488- 
92.
44. See, for example, M usonius Rufus, F ra g m en t 17; Epictetus, D isco u rse s  1.4.15; 
3.7.24-28; Seneca, E pistle  122.5-19; O n  th e  H a p p y  L ife  13.4-5: natural desires are ones 
which are neither excessive nor insatiable.
45. Plutarch, O n  M o r a l V ir tu e  450E: “But he who permits the better part to follow  
and be in subjection to the intemperate and irrational part o f  his soul is called worse than 
him self and incontinent (Aicpcm)?) and in a state contrary to Nature (rrapix (|>t3oiv).”
206
Natural and Unnatural Use in Romans 1:24-27
Building on the equivalence of “without passion” and “according to na­
tu re” a basic distinction between two types of sexual desire took shape, not 
only among the Stoics but among other philosophical schools, with adapta­
tions in terminology appropriate to each school.46 The first type is natural 
desire (4>uaiKt| fejnOupfa), put forward by Aristotle in analogy with the con­
sumption of food; continuing on with the analogy, the second type of sexual 
desire is understood as if it were an excess in the quantity consumed .47 
Epicurus proposed a more complex categorization of pleasures: the natural 
and necessary, the natural but unnecessary, the empty or unnatural and un ­
necessary. Sexual desire was placed in the second category, yet when this de­
sire becomes excessive it moves into the third .48 For a broad range of thinkers, 
since Eros is insatiable, it is “against nature .”49
C. The Problem of Eros in Romans 1:24-27
Our investigation o f the philosophic background o f Paul’s term XPHa 'C leads 
us to consider the possibility that Romans 1:24-27 highlights the problem of 
passion and its consequences rather than the violation of a divinely instituted 
norm  of male and female intercourse. Additionally, we have seen that al­
though “the natural” has a range of meaning in ancient writers, the most 
likely parallel to Paul’s usage is the philosophic interest in the problem of self- 
control in the face of erotic love. Unnatural use, from this perspective, has less 
to do with the gender of the persons having sex and more with the loss of self- 
control experienced by the user of another’s body.
46. S to ico ru m  V e te ru m  F ra g m en ta  3.98.20-21: natural needs, including marriage, 
can be pursued without passion. Panaetius (in Seneca, E p is tle  116.5) hints at the possibility 
o f  the wise man becom ing a lover while preserving his rationality because o f  his prior v ic­
tory over passion. Cf. Epictetus, E tic h e ir id io n  34, 41. See G. Luck, “Panaetius and 
Menander,” A m er ica n  J o u rn a l o f  P h ilo lo g y  96 (1975): 257-62. For the distinction between 
passionate love and harmless love, see M. Pohlenz, “Das dritte und vierte Buch der 
Tusculanen,” H e rm e s  41 (1906): 349-51.
47. Aristotle, N ico tn a ch ea n  E th ics  3.11.1-3.
48. Brown, p. 105; M. Nussbaum, “Beyond Obsession and Disgust: Lucretius’ Gene­
alogy o f  Love,” A p e iro n  22 (1989): 13; J. Annas, “Epicurean Emotions,” G reek, R o m a n  a n d  
B y za n tin e  S tu d ie s  30 (1989): 147-53. Cf. Plutarch, B easts  A re  R a tio n a l 9 89C-990F; Clement 
o f  Alexandria, S tro m a te is  2.20.118.7; 3.1.3.2; P aedagogu s  2.10.94.2.
49. See S. Lilja, H o m o se x u a lity  in  R ep u b lica n  a n d  A u g u s ta n  R o m e, Com m entationes 
Humanarum Litterarum 74 (Helsinki: Societas Scientarum Fennica, 1982), pp. 124-25; 
Brown, pp. 107, 229-31.
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This interpretation is confirmed once the case has been made that key 
points of Paul’s argument are informed by a psychology of erotic love known 
to the ancient world .50 Although Paul does not explicitly name epioq as the 
culprit in the hum an condition described in l:24-27,51 a string of terms 




6 pe i^<; (appetite, 1:27)
7tX6 vri (error, 1:27)
Each term by itself can be shown to have a key role in the ancient discussion 
of erotic love; taken together we have a rough outline of the philosophic cri­
tique of gpcoq. Romans 1:24-27 is not an attack on homosexuality as a viola­
tion of divine law but a description of the hum an condition informed by the 
philosophic rejection of passionate love.
The first indication that Paul is going to build an argument around the 
topic of spcog comes in 1:24: “the desires of their hearts (rode; £mOupiai<; rcov 
KapSitov aOxtov).” Desire (femOupia) was one of the four major types of passion, 
along with grief, fear, and pleasure.52 Although it is necessary to distinguish 
£7T10U|lUoc and Sptog, since the latter was a “more exclusive passion involving 
emotional and psychological commitment beyond the consummation of any 
desire,”53 erotic love was nevertheless thought to be a kind of 6m0o|Liiot.54 It be­
gan in 6m0up(a,55 and could be characterized as the “runaway movement of the 
desiderative power (^mOupqTiKfj? Suvdpewg).”56 Love’s object was the body of
50. For a concise history o f Eros, which correctly emphasizes the issue o f  self-con­
trol, see Konstan, pp. 178-85.
51. For Paul’s familiarity with literary conventions pertaining to £pcog, see C. Smith, 
“'EkkXeTocu in Galatians 4:17: The M otif o f  the Excluded Lover as a Metaphor o f M anipu­
lation,” C a th o lic  B ib lica l Q u a r te r ly  58 (1996): 480-99. Consider also the dich6 “love as slav­
ery” in 1 Cor. 6:12; see S. Lilja, T h e R o m a n  E leg ists’ A t t i tu d e  to  W om en  (New York: Garland, 
1978), pp. 76-89.
52. See the collection o f texts in Glibert-Thirry, 223.3-10; pp. 274-76.
53. Dean-Jones, p. 57 n. 18. Cf. Halperin, “Platonic E rd s” pp. 171-76.
54. Glibert-Thirry, 229.76; A. C. van Geytenbeek, M u so n iu s  R u fu s a n d  G reek  D ia ­
tr ib e  (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962), p. 76; M. Schofield, T h e S to ic  Idea  o f  th e C ity  (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 30 n. 17.
55. Plato, P h a e d ru s  237D; 238BC; Xenophon, M e m o ra b ilia  3.9.7; S to ico ru m  V eteru m  
F ragm en ta  3.96.43; Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  767C.
56. Galen, O n  th e  D o c tr in e s  o f  H ip p o cra te s  a n d  P la to  4.1.16. Cf. Plutarch, F ra g m en t
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another, with no specification of gender.57 Also, as in Paul, philosophic and lit­
erary discourse associated the heart with matters erotic.58
In 1:26 Paul employs another term borrowed from philosophy’s treat­
ment of erotic love: “passion” (tt&Ocx;)-59 The fact that &7n0 u|ufa and rraOog 
stand in parallel phrases in 1:24 and 26 (“God handed them over . . .”) justi­
fies our attempt to interpret them together under the theme of excessive sex­
ual desire.60 The connection between dishonor and the experience of passion 
to which Paul’s phrase “dishonorable passions (tt&Ot) dmpiac;)” alludes will be 
discussed below. For now it is only necessary to take note of Paul’s use of 
7T&0O<; as a reflection of the discussion of £piog in philosophic and literary 
contexts. We see in these sources that it was the unbridled character of erotic 
love that was expressed with the help of jt&0og61 We should also note that in 
sexual matters 7tcc0 o<; is employed without regard to the gender of either the 
subject or the object of desire.62
135. Along these same lines, the Stoics placed two types o f  excessive sexual passion under 
the category o f dmOupfoc: gpwtec; o<])o5po( and £ptOTopavi'a. See Preston, pp. 8-9.
57. Xenophon, S y m p o s iu m  8.2, 13.
58. Zeno, for example, placed imOu/not and 0up6<; in the heart. See Galen, O n  th e  
D o c tr in e s  o f  H ip p o cra te s  a n d  P la to  3.2.7. Cf. 4.1.17 for Chrysippus’s similar view. See also 
Achilles Tatius, L eu c ip p e  a n d  C lito p h o n  3.37.6-10. For “hearts on fire,” a notion discussed 
below in connection with Rom. 1:27, see G reek  A n th o lo g y  5.260; 9.627; 12.130. For the 
heart’s place in speech about Sptog, see Preston, p. 49; D. H. Garrison, M ild  F ren zy: A R ea d ­
in g  o f  th e H e llen is tic  L o ve  E p ig ra m  (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1978), pp. 75-77.
59. For the definition o f  rrdcOoi;, se e  n. 42 above.
60. In 1 Thess. 4:5 Paul’s exhortation im plies the possibility o f  sex w ithout passion: 
pi) t v  7td0ei ^mOupi'aq. For the notion o f passionless sex, see Brown, pp. 216-18. W ithin the 
context o f  marriage, see Philo, S p ec ia l L a w s  3.9; Clement o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s  
2.10.92.2; Ps.-Phocylides, S en ten ces  193-94; 4 Maccabees 2:11. For discussion o f  these 
texts, see I. Heinem ann, P h ilo n s g r iech ish e  u n d  ju d isc h e  B ild u n g : K u ltu rv e rg le ic h e n d e  
U n tersu ch u n gen  z u  P h ilo n s D a rs te llu n g  d e r  j i id isc h e  G ese tze  (Hildesheim: Olms, 1962), pp. 
276-77; van Geytenbeek, pp. 72-73. Passionless sex may also be what Paul has in m ind  
when he exhorts his male readers in 1 Thess. 4:4: t6  £c<utoO okcOo? KtaoOai t v  ayiaapto xa) 
Ttpfj. For “having a wife in honor” and its connection to the passion o f the husband, see 
M. Foucault, T h e H is to r y  o f  S ex u a lity , vol. 3, T h e C a re  o f  th e  S e lf  (New York: Random  
House, 1988), p. 174.
61. See Lilja, R o m a n  E leg is ts’ A tt i tu d e ,  pp. 89-109; A. Allen, “Propertius I, 1,” Yale 
C lassica l S tu d ie s  11 (1950): 258-64; Brown, p. 197. Cf. Ps.-Phocylides, S en ten ces  194: “For 
‘eros’ is not a god, but a passion destructive o f all” (translation is P. W. van der Horst, T he  
S en ten ces o f  P seu d o -P h o cy lid es  [Leiden: Brill, 1978], p. 240).
62. Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  75 IF: “Excitement (ndOo?) about boys and wom en is one 
and the same thing: Love.” See also Ps.-Lucian, A ffa irs  o f  th e H e a r t  4. Plutarch’s observation 
is a lesson learned easily from reading erotic epigrams. See G reek A n th o lo g y  5.19, 65, 116, 
278, 302; 1 2 .3 1 ,41 ,86 , 90.
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Paul’s familiarity with the literary and philosophical ways of speaking 
about epcog becomes even more evident when we consider the phrase “they 
were inflamed for one another (££eKCXU0r]oav eic, aXXrjXoug)” in 1:27.63 Fire 
was the principal m etaphor of sexual love in a broad range of literary genres 
and in philosophy.64 The m etaphor emphasized the misery of the lover, his 
perpetually unsatisfied state, and the loss of self-control. Fire imagery makes 
vivid the philosophic description of the perennial battle between reason and 
passion in sexual matters.65 Significantly, there is no restriction on the gender 
of the beloved who has inflamed the lover. One and the same Iptog inflames 
males for males, males for females, females for males, and females for fe­
males.66
The experience of erotic love as fire was given a physiological founda­
tion by some authors. Hot blood in young men causes “desire ( t6  
6m0u|iiiTiKOv)” to be “at its height.”67 Heat had a crucial role to play in the 
production of semen, which, when expelled, quenched the fire of love.68 It is 
im portant to observe that when the fire of love is explained in physiological
63. For Paul’s familiarity w ith fire imagery for excessive sexual desire in 1 Cor. 7:9, 
see W. Dem ing, P a u l o n  M a r r ia g e  a n d  C e libacy : T h e  H e llen is tic  B a ck g ro u n d  o f l  C o r in th ia n s  
7, SNTS 83 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 130-31.
64. Henderson, pp. 177-78; E. Fantham, C o m p a r a tiv e  S tu d ie s  in  R e p u b lica n  L a tin  
Im a g e ry  (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 8 -12 ,83-88 . Fire imagery (with 
giddiness, distraction, turning pale, and the like) is almost always present in descriptions 
o f  persons who have fallen under the spell o f  gpwg: Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  763A; F ra g m en t  
137; Philo, O n  th e  D eca lo g u e  122; Chariton, C h a rea s  a n d  C a llirh o e  4.2.4-5; Longus, 
D a p h n is  a n d  C h lo e  1.11, 13, 14, 18, 23; 2.7, 8; G reek A n th o lo g y  5.264.
65. S to ico ru m  V e te ru m  F ra g m en ta  3.179.20-26; Plutarch, O n  M o r a l V ir tu e  448B;
4 Maccabees 3:17. This philosophic cliche shows up in literary contexts as well: Ovid, R e m ­
ed ies f o r  L o ve  115-34; Chariton, C h a rea s a n d  C a llirh o e  2.4.4-5.
66. The m etaphor’s indifference to gender is well illustrated in the opening o f  the 
following epigram (G reek  A n th o lo g y  12.90) spoken by a male: “No longer do I love (ipco). I 
have wrestled with three passions that burn (gKocucxe): one for a courtesan, one for a 
maiden, and one for a lad.” Males on fire for males: G reek  A n th o lo g y  5.6; 12.74; Chariton, 
C h a rea s a n d  C a llirh o e  4.16-17; Maximus o f  Tyre, D isco u rse  20.5D; males on fire for fe­
males: Virgil, E clogues 8.80-83; Ps.-Hippocrates, E pistle  17.42; female desire for males: Plu­
tarch, A m a to r iu s  753A-B; Ovid, R e m e d ie s  f o r  L o ve  267, 287-88; Achilles Tatius, L eu c ip p e  
a n d  C lito p h o n  2.37.9; female for female: Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  762F.
67. Ps.-Plutarch, D e s ire  a n d  G r ie f  9; Cf. Clem ent o f  Alexandria, P a ed a g o g u s  
2.2.20.3-21.1. For the role o f  warmth in the generation o f  desire, se e  Brown, p p .  182-83. In 
addition, see Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  765B; Philo, S p ec ia l L a w s  3.10. The physiological basis o f  
sexual desire did not, however, make it exempt from moral reflection and control. See D i­
ogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  7.17; Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.428.1-429.8  
(H ierodes).
68. Clement o f  Alexandria, S tro m a te is  3.1.2.1-2.
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terms, the causes o f the heat are located within the individual’s body. This 
should be contrasted with the overwhelming majority o f cases in which fire 
imagery emphasizes the external source o f erotic passion. Here, I believe, is 
the background for understanding Paul’s use of the image. Fire imagery most 
often reinforced the notion that sexual passion is a force which invades the 
lover from the outside.69
Fire imagery thus accents the passive character of the desiring subject.70 
Paul’s use of £kkoci'oo in the passive voice reflects the idea bemoaned by philoso­
phers and reluctantly celebrated by poets that the passion of love invades and 
overwhelms the individual.71 Like an arrow dipped in fire, epcog penetrates 
the heart.72 Erotic madness seizes its victims and sets them on fire.73 Just how 
fire is kindled by the beloved may have remained a mystery to some.74 Yet it was 
often suggested that the eyes of the lover are the medium to the outside world, 
and through them fire enters the soul.75 To see or imagine the beloved kindles 
fire.76 One of the most common cliches in the love epigram, that a beautiful 
form “casts fire” on the lover, expresses well his passive role.77 Thus, while m od­
ern thinking about sexuality posits erotic desire as the externalization of a deep, 
internal disposition, the imagery of fire employed by the ancients reveals a 
movement in just the opposite direction. Our interpretation o f Paul’s use of fire 
imagery in 1:27 will need to take into account this difference. Paul is not speak­
ing of the externalization of sexual orientation deep in the individual’s person­
ality. Rather, he expresses the philosophic view that passion invades from out­
side and overwhelms the subject. As we will see below, this latter interpretation 
fits best with the overall rhetorical purpose of Romans 1:18-32.
Fire imagery also communicated ideas o f frustration and insatiability.
69. K. Dover, “Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexual Behaviour,” Arethusa 6  (1973):
272.
70. Greek Anthology 5.10,75; 11.36; 1 2 .4 6 ,48 ,63 ,79 ,99 ,178; Akiphron, Epistle 3.31; 
Ovid, Affairs o f the Heart 1.2.9-17.
71. For the com plex m eaning o f  the images which reverse the role o f  the lover from  
the one who penetrates to the one penetrated by passion, see Garrison, pp. 26-27.
72. Greek Anthology 9.443; 12.76.
73. Plutarch, Amatorius 759B-C.
74. Greek Anthology 5.131.
75. Xenophon, Symposium 4.24-25; Plutarch, Amatorius 759C; Fragment 138; Greek 
Anthology 12 .81 ,83 ,87 ,93 ,99 ,151; Heliodorus, Aethiopica 1.24; Philostratus, Epistles 8 ,11 ,
12. On this theme, see A. Walker, “Eros and the Eye in the Love-Letters o f  Philostratus,” 
Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 38 (1992): 132-48.
76. Plutarch, Advice to Bride and Groom 138F; Chariton, Chareas and Callirhoe 
6.4.5-7.
77. Greek Anthology 12.81, 82, 8 6 , 87, 109. See also the texts in Brown, p. 195.
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With respect to the former, any impediment to the lover’s possession of the 
beloved, whether it be refusal of advances or unforeseen circumstances, in ­
flamed the soul.78 More significant for our interpretation of the Pauline argu­
ment, however, is the association of fire with the perpetuation of erotic desire 
after the sexual act.79 As Chariton reminds his readers, eptog in its very nature 
is always looking for something new (<|»A6kcuvo<;): “that is why poets and 
sculptors depict him with bow and arrows and associate him  with fire, the 
most insubstantial, mutable of attributes.”80 Under the influence of erotic de­
sire, the lover is inflamed by consummation of sex itself to seek more and 
novel loves.81 Epictetus compares passionate love to a feverish thirst which is 
intensified by drinking water.82 Dio Chrysostom’s depiction of the person de­
voted to pleasure brings together the themes of fire, insatiability, and, as in 
Paul’s argument, the resulting movement from females to males as objects of 
male sexual desire: “He is of many hues and shapes, insatiable (6 jTAtjptoroc;) as 
to things that tickle nostril and palate. . . .” Dio continues:
He is passionately devoted to all these things [pleasures of the five senses], 
but especially and unrestrainedly to the poignant and burning madness 
(bestow Kal Si&jrupov gaviotv) of sexual indulgence, through intercourse 
both with females and with males, and through still other unspeakable and 
nameless obscenities; after all such indiscriminately he rushes and also 
leads others, abjuring no form of lust and leaving none untried.83
78. Seneca, O n  B en e fits  4.14.1; Philo, O n  th e  C o n te m p la tiv e  L ife  61; G reek  A n th o lo g y  
5.255, 279; Philostratus, E p istle  13.
79. Brown, pp. 236, 238-39.
80. Chariton, C h o rea s  a n d  C a llir lio e  4.7.6. Cf. Ps.-Lucian, A ffa irs  o f  th e  H e a r th  “For, 
almost from the time I left o ff being a boy and was accounted a young man, I have been be­
guiled by one passion after another. One Love has succeeded another, and alm ost before
I’ve ended earlier ones later Loves begin___ For one flame is not extinguished by another.
There dwells in m y eyes so nim ble a gadfly that it pounces on any and every beauty as its 
prey and is never sated enough to stop.”
81. Philo, S p ec ia l L a w s  3.9-10: “Now even natural pleasure (f| Kart* (|>uaiv f|5ovf|) is 
often greatly to blame when the craving for it is immoderate and insatiable (dp^rptog rod 
dicop&mog xPOToci rig afrrfj), as for instance when it takes the form o f voracious gluttony 
. . .  or again the passionate desire for wom en shewn by those who in their craze for sexual 
intercourse behave unchastely, not with the wives o f others, but with their own. But the 
blame in m ost o f  these cases rests less with the soul than with the body, which contains a 
great am ount o f  fire and moisture; the fire as it consum es the material set before it quickly 
demands a second su pp ly .. . . ” Cf. Clement o f  Alexandria, P aedagogu s  2.10.102.1-2; Q u is  
d iv e s  s a lv e tu r  25.
82. Epictetus, D isco u rse  4.9.3-5. See above, n. 29.
83. D io Chrysostom, D isco u rse  4.101-102.
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The ancient psychology of Eros pictured the fire of love springing up in 
the dps^u; (appetite), a word which Paul employs in Romans 1:27. This was a 
fundamental term in the Stoic analysis of human action and was often coordi­
nated with nfrQoc, and fmOupia in broader philosophic discussions of sexual de­
sire. The Stoics defined ope^ig as an impulse toward that which the agent thinks 
is good .84 Ancient writers sharpened the meaning of 6 pe£iQ by comparing it 
with £m0ugi'a. Clement of Alexandria, for example, alludes to a common dis­
tinction: “They who are skilled in such matters distinguish propension (ope^i?) 
from lust (EmOupi'a); and assign the latter, as being irrational, to pleasures and 
licentiousness; and propension, as being a rational movement, they assign to 
the necessities of nature .”85 Discussions of erotic passion generally assume 
opE i^c; as a neutral term, a structured way humans appropriate parts of the ex­
ternal world; Epcog is opE^ig which has become irrational and excessive.86
Epictetus is an im portant source for understanding the role bpeipc; plays 
in the Stoic analysis of hum an action and ultimately in Paul’s argument.87 Ac­
cording to Epictetus, three fields constitute hum an activity: desire (dpe^ig), 
choice (6 ppfj), and assent (auYKOCT&0eau; ) .88 Each has to do with the agent’s 
activity of selecting and acquiring objects in the external world .89 ope^tg de­
picts the agent’s movement toward the object; its opposite is aversion 
(ekkAiotc;).90 For Epictetus, Specie; was natural when its object could be ob-
84. M. Reesor, T h e N a tu r e  o f  M a n  in  E a r ly  S to ic  P h ilo so p h y  (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1989), pp. 91, 97. Diogenes Laertius, L ives o f  E m in e n t P h ilo so p h ers  7.116; S to ico ru m  
V eteru m  F ra g m en ta  3.42.20; 3.94.10; Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  2 .9 7 .1 5 -9 8 .6 ;  Galen, O n  th e  D o c ­
tr in es  o f  P lip p o cra tes a n d  P la to  4.4.2; 5.7.29. Brad Inwood’s paraphrase o f  the Stoic defini­
tions is helpful: “Any action whose object is the good or what the agent takes to be good 
will be caused and defined by the form o f  impulse known as orexis” (Inwood, p. 114). Cf. 
pp. 115, 227-37.
85. Clement o f  Alexandria, S tro m a tc is  4.18.117.5 (translation is A n te -N ic e n e  F a­
thers, 2:431). For imOupfa as irrational appetite (ftAoyoc opzfyc;), see texts collected in 
Glibert-Thirry, 223.16-17; pp. 278-79. For the definition o f  legitimate sexual practice in 
terms o f  this distinction, see Foucault, C a re  o f  th e  Self, p. 200. Cf. Ocellus, O n  th e  N a tu r e  o f  
th e  U n iverse  44.
86. Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  750D. This was emphasized particularly by Epicureans; see 
S to ico ru m  V eteru m  F ra g m en ta  3.181.22, 27-28 and the texts discussed in Brown, pp. 113, 
277, and Nussbaum, pp. 11-17. Cf. Clement o f Alexandria, S tro m a tc is  2.20.118.7-119.6.
87. For Epictetus’s teaching on dpc^i? in relation to the Old Stoa, see Inwood, pp. 
116-26.
88. For the three fields o f  human activity, see P. More, H elle n is tic  P h ilo so p h ie s  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), pp. 108-13. In Epictetus, see D iscou rses  
2.8.29; 2.17.15-16; 3.2.1-4; 3.12.1-12; 3.22.42-44; 4.4.14-18; 4.6.18, 26.
89. Epictetus, D isco u rse  4.6.26.
90. Epictetus, D isco u rse s  1.17.24; 2.24.19.
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tained with certainty and without hindrance .91 Desire for objects which 
might not come into the subject’s acquisition and yield satisfaction, Epictetus 
labels “unnatural.”92
Examination of an individual’s 6 psi;ig and its objects could reveal 
whether he was happy or miserable, self-respecting or full of shame, since 
this analysis discovered whether the person was effectual in his desires or 
continually wanting things over which he had no control.93 Now, with re­
spect to this inner connection of 6pzfy<; and satiability, we find an illumi­
nating parallel between Paul and Epictetus. Both use fire imagery, which 
calls forth the idea of insatiability, to depict the Specie; in a bad state. Paul’s 
phrase “they were inflamed in their desire (^EKai30qoav £v rp 6 p ^ e i)” in 
Romans 1:27 echoes Epictetus’s use of fire imagery to depict the impulse to­
ward the perceived good that through passion has oriented itself to objects 
over which it does not have control.94 Calling upon the three fields of hu ­
man activity, Epictetus outlines the philosopher’s diagnosis of an individual 
in such a state: “Your desires are feverish (od dpi^ev; aou ^Xeypafyoumv), 
your attempts to avoid things ( ekicM o e k ; )  are humiliating, your purposes 
(femPoXaf) are inconsistent, your choices (6 ppoc0  are out of harmony with 
your nature, your conceptions (wroXqtpEiO are hit-or-miss and false.”95 In-
91. Epictetus, Discourses 1.4.1; 1.19.2; 2.8.29; 2.14.8; 2.17.15-18; 3.9.22,104; 3.23.9, 
12; 4.1.1, 4; 4.10.4-7. Cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 3.88.42-44.
92. Epictetus, Discourse 1.21.2. Cf. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 3.6.30.
93. Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.61; 3.26.14; 4.4.35; 4.5.27; 4.4.6; Encheiridion 1.1-3;
2. 1- 2.
94. “Inflamed desire” designates the sudden transformation o f  the normal appetite 
for necessary things and their natural use into ndOog: Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 
3.124.38-125.1: rrjg 4>XeYpovfjg rwv TtaOtov; Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and 
Plato 4.7.27-28: rraOeriKfi ^Xeypovn; Plutarch, Fragment 137: (j>Xeypovf| dmOoplag; Philo, 
On the Posterity o f Cain and His Exile 71: (fiXeyouarig rfjg femOuplag; On the Giants 34-35: 
“For there are som e things which we must admit, as, for instance, the actual necessities o f  
life, the use o f  which (xpd>pevoi) will enable us to live in health and free from sickness. But 
we m ust reject w ith scorn the superfluities which kindle the lusts (i^anrdpevai al 
dmOup(ai) that w ith a single flame burst consum e (KaxatJjXfyouoi) every good thing. Let 
not our appetites (od 6 p^eig), then, be whetted and incited towards anything dear to the 
flesh.” See also Clement o f  Alexandria, Paedagogus 2.4.42.1; Quis dives salvetur 15. See 
Inwood, p. 152.
95. Epictetus, Discourse 2.14.21. Plutarch (On Moral Virtue 450E-F) also knows the 
inflamed 6 pel;ig; his Platonism, however, leads him  to conceptualize the root problem as 
the ill effects o f  em bodied existence rather than the Stoic emphasis on erroneous choice: 
“For, in accordance with Nature, it is proper that reason, which is divine, should lead and 
rule the irrational, which derives its origin directly from the body to which Nature has de­
signed that it should bear a resemblance and share in the body’s passions and be contami-
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flammation in the Spe^iq is desire for an object which does not bring satia­
tion. Again Paul follows the philosophic critique of Eros by highlighting the 
problem of passion.
Our exploration of the psychology and critique of erotic desire behind 
Paul’s argument moves to its final term in 1:27: rrXdvq (error). Here again 
Paul makes use of a commonplace in literary treatments of fe'pwg. The Latin 
equivalent of rrX&vn, error, was synonymous with furor and insania, and for 
those writers who distinguished between sex with passion and sex without, 
error designated the former.* 96 A similar idea is found in Testament of Reuben 
where the spirit of error marks the transition from sex for the sake of beget­
ting children to sex for pleasure.97 The source for this image of wandering 
from the path is most likely the philosophic notion of losing one’s way on the 
road of life.98 As Seneca testifies, error is introduced when natural desire is ex­
ceeded and passion enters into the way objects are possessed.99
This examination of the philosophic critique of Eros which stands be­
hind Romans 1:24-27 has helped us to confirm the earlier conclusion that it is 
not Paul’s interest to condemn homosexuality but to highlight sexual passion 
(£m0 u|ui'oc, jt&0 o<;), which is uniform with respect to the gender of the desired 
object. Paul tells the story of humans who have been overwhelmed by pas­
sion. The capacity (dpe^ig) for acquiring what they believe to be good has 
been inflamed, and so they are in a constant state of frustration, unable to be 
sated. Their error (rrAc3cvr|) was to exchange normal use for erotic love.
nated by it, since it has entered into the body and becom e merged with it; that this is so is 
shown by our impulses (a l 6 ppa(), which arise and set in m otion toward corporeal objects 
and becom e violent or relax in keeping w ith the changes o f  the body. For this reason young 
m en are swift and im petuous and fiery in their appetites (r(tc, 6 p^ei<; bidrrupoi), and stung 
by madness, as it were, through the abundance o f  and heat o f  their blood; but in old m en 
the source o f  desire (6 pxh rou foriOupnmcou), which is seated in the liver, is in the process 
o f  being extinguished (KaraoP^wurai) and becom ing small and w eak .. . . ” Further exam ­
ples o f  inflam ed Specie: Clem ent o f  Alexandria, Quis dives salvetur 25; Heliodorus, 
Aethiopica 1.26.
96. Preston, p. 10. For nk6vr\lerror in erotic contexts, see Plato, Phaedo 81A; Plu­
tarch, On the Eating o f Flesh, II, 997B; Ovid, Atnores 1.2.35; Virgil, Eclogues 8.41. These and 
other texts are discussed by Lilja (Roman Elegists’Attitude, pp. 93 ,108 , and Homosexuality, 
p. 63 n. 55) and Brown (pp. 221-23, 239).
97. Testament o f  Reuben 2:1, 8 ; 3:2; 4:6.
98. Tabula of Cebes 5.2-6 .6 . See the helpful note in J. Fitzgerald and L. W hite, The 
Tabula of Cebes, Texts and Translations 24, Graeco-Roman Series 7 (Chico, Calif.: Scholars 
Press, 1983), p. 139 n. 16. See also Epictetus, Discourse 1.18.3-6; Stobaeus, Anthology 
3.233.8-11; 3.235.4-5.
99. Seneca, Epistle 16.9.
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D. Punishment and the Result of Erotic Passion
We will conclude our study of Romans 1:24-27 by attempting to make clear 
why Paul highlights passion. According to 1:18-32, passion and the dishonor 
it brings is the divine punishm ent for ingratitude and failure to glorify God. 
The topic of 1:18-32 is the anger of God, its provocation, and its conse­
quences. As for the cause of God’s anger, a relation between anger and injus­
tice is established in 1:18: “For the anger of God is being revealed from 
heaven against all irreverence and injustice of humans who are suppressing 
the truth of God in injustice.” Paul states that God’s anger comes from injus­
tice intentionally committed against his person . 100 Irreverence was widely 
recognized as the form injustice took in the relation of the hum an to the di­
vine . 101
In 1:21 we discover the nature of the wrong committed against God. It 
is the refusal to give God what is God’s due: glory and gratitude. 102 This re­
fusal is inexcusable since God’s divinity and eternal power can be read off of 
the arrangement of the universe.103 Receiving neither honor nor thanksgiv­
ing, God is wronged and dishonored . 104 Paul thus treats idolatry as a personal 
affront to God; it robs him of honor.105 The consequence of God’s anger is 
punishment of those who have treated him unjustly. This fits well with the 
definition of anger which sees in it a desire for punishment so that the wrong­
doer suffers dishonor on par with the one wronged . 106 How does “handing 
over” generate dishonor among those who have wronged God?
The commonplace notion that erotic passion brings the lover into dis­
honor underlies Paul’s argument in 1:24-27. In 1:24 we read that God handed 
idolaters “into impurity in order that their bodies might be dishonored 
among them (sig araOctpoiav you 6mp&£ea0 cu rb. adbpcrra aurwv ev atiioTg).”
100. For the definition o f anger, see Glibert-Thirry, 231.81-82; p. 290.
101. Glibert-Thirry, 267.37.
102. For gratitude and reverence as types o f  BiKOtiocuvn, see Glibert-Thirry, 255.34- 
36; 257.43-52; pp. 313-14. For gratitude as the proper response to the divine, see Dio 
Chrysostom, D isco u rse  12.43.
103. Testament o f Naphtali 3:1-5; D io Chrysostom, D isco u rse  12.27-34,39. Note es­
pecially D isco u rse  12.35 where divine “will and power (yvobyiri koc! 56vapu;)” are “very clear 
(£vapyi)c;) and evident (np65r|Xog),” and the proper response is to “recognize and honour 
(xipav) the god and desire to live according to his ordinance.” See also D isco u rse  12.70.
104. Cf. Rom. 2:23: t 6 v  0e6v
105. Philo ( O n  D ru n k en n ess  110) similarly regards idolatry as dishonoring God: 
“God’s honor (Oeou tipfjc) is set at naught by those who deify the mortal.” Cf. D io  
Chrysostom, D isco u rse  12.36: uirep^povouai rix Oeia.
106. See n. 100 above.
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Excessive passion (ev talc; emOupiag tcov Kccpbitov) is the means by which this 
handing over occurred . 107 In 1:26 Paul reiterates the connection between 
punishment, passion, and dishonor: “God handed them over into passions of 
dishonor (rrapebcoKSV auxouq 6  Oebg dq rraOn uxipiaq).” Here again punish­
ment consists of being handed over to passion —  itself dishonorable to 
have. 108
In 1:27 Paul speaks of “the punishment which was necessary from their 
error (xf|v dvrtpioOIav ijv e5ei xfjq 7rXdvr|q auxwv).” The striking aspect of this 
formulation is the necessity which links punishment (dvripioOia) to error 
(nAavri). Punishment was a central metaphor for the ill effects on the lover of 
his own passionate love. 109 Punishment following the consummation of 
erotic desire was part of a larger configuration of ideas in which Eros was a 
destructive passion, taking its toll on the finances, mental equilibrium, and 
the honor of the lover. 110
Finally, in 1:27 the term ocoxripoauvri (unseemly conduct) accentuates 
the theme that erotic passion brings dishonor in its wake. 111 Its antonym,
107. The notion o f dishonor is obvious in the term dTipdqeoOai, but &Ka0apa(a re­
quires som e clarification. For the notion o f  sexual offenses as “metaphorical moral 
pollutions” and the connection between degradation and defilement, see R. Parker, M i­
asma: Pollution and Purification in Early G reek  Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), pp. 94- 
100,146-53; Adams, pp. 198-99. Other examples are found in Epictetus, Discourses 2.8.14; 
4.11.5; D io Chrysostom, Discourse 7.134; Ps.-Lucian, Affairs of the Heart 22; and especially 
Plutarch, Fragment 47. For this developm ent in  lew ish sources, see van der Horst, pp. 258- 
60. See further Testament o f  Joseph 4:6; Testament o f  Benjamin 6:5; 8:2; Epistle o f  Aristeas 
152.
108. For the theme o f  sexual passion bringing dishonor (dmpia), see N. R. E. Fisher, 
Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster: Aris 8c 
Phillips, 1992), p. 14; Lilja, Roman Elegists' Attitude, pp. 89-96; van der Horst, pp. 158-59. 
See also Clement o f Alexandria, Paedagogus 2.10.100.1; Ps.-Lucian, Affairs of the Heart 20: 
“a little pleasure at the cost o f  great disgrace (peydXriv « 6 o(;i'av).” Cf. Affairs o f the Heart 24: 
“honourable names to dishonourable passions (jidcOeoiv aioxpoTg).”
109. Brown, pp. 216-19, 227. In addition to the texts cited by Brown, see Philo, On 
the Contemplative Life 61; Clement o f  Alexandria, Quis dives salvetur 25.
110. See Brown, pp. 111-13, 248-51. Sec also Epictetus, Discourse 4.1.15-23; Plu­
tarch, Fragment 136; Seneca, Epistle 116.5.
111. It is difficult to see this idea in modern translations. NRSV: “Men committed 
shameless acts with men.” NIV: “Men committed indecent acts with other men.” The prob­
lem here is thinking o f  aoxtipoouvri as an act, since the social dimension (present in a word 
containing the oxnp- root) is lost. Furthermore, a word ending with -auvr) tends not to refer 
to an act but to a state o f  being. Thus, “producing dishonor” might better catch the sense. 
Phrases similar to Pauls do not accentuate the deed so much as the dishonor arising from the 
passion which propels the deed: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.6.7: Adyiipoouvriv <J>6p[i; 
Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 13.607B-C: ri)v jraoav daxni-ioauvqv dnSeiicvuvTOCi; Dio
David E. Fredrickson
euaxnMoauvri (decorum), denoted the respectable appearance of the person 
who displayed control over the passions.* 112 <5caxr|poai3vri, on the other hand, 
pointed to the public perception of failure to control passion. 113 Overindul­
gence in the pleasures which might otherwise be used with moderation pro­
duces &oxnMoauvr| . 114 This is especially true of erotic pleasure.115
E. Loss of Self-Control and Hybris in 1 Corinthians 6:9
In the context of a vice list (1 Cor. 6:9-10) meant to amplify the notion of in­
justice, Paul calls upon the terms paXaKdq (soft) and 6 paevoKoiTr)C. 116 The 
meaning of each term has been hotly contested, but there seems to be some 
agreement on viewing the terms as the passive and active partners in male- 
with-male sexual activity.117 Another way to understand these two terms is
Chrysostom, Discourse 7.110: &oxnhO0i3vnv re m l &v£Xeu0epi'av ^vriierouai. As for 
KCXTepY<5(£o|iai, is it fanciful to think that Paul is punning on a com m on euphemism for sex­
ual effort, “work (2pyov)”? For £pyov in erotic contexts, see Preston, pp. 15-16,33-34; D. F. 
Kennedy, The Arts of Love: Five Studies in the Discourse of Roman Love Elegy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 59-60, 62. Achilles Tatius, Leucippe and Clitophon 
2.37.5; Strabo, Geographica 10.4.21: KOiTepY&tovTai robe £p«|i£voug.
112. In Stoicism it is coordinated w ith the important concept o f  t6 Ttp&tov (that 
which is fitting). See P. A. Brunt, “Aspects o f  the Social Thought o f  D io Chrysostom and 
the Stoics,” Proceedings o f the Cambridge Philological Society 19 (1979): 19-20. For good ex­
amples o f  euoxnpo(n3vri as m oderation for the sake o f  public perception, see M usonius 
Rufus, Fragments 8 , 18B; Epictetus, Discourses 2.5.23; 4.9.9-12. Public perception is im por­
tant in 1 Thess. 4:12.
113. The public aspect is stressed by Epictetus (Discourse 3.22.2, 8 , 15, 52); see 
M. Billerbeck, Epiktet: Vom Kynismus, Philosophia Antiqua 34 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 47.
114. Ps.-Crates, Epistle 10.2; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 1.103;
3.39.
115. Recognized by Paul; see Dem ing, pp. 206-7. For EuaxnMOOuvri as self-control in 
erotic contexts, see Ps.-M usonius, Epistle 1.4; Theano, Epistle 5.3 (Thesleff, 199.14). For 
Aoxfipoouvn in erotic contexts, see M usonius Rufus, Fragment 12 (cf. Clement o f  Alexan­
dria, Paedagogus 2.10.97.2); Epictetus, Discourse4.9.5; Philo, On the Decalogue 168-69; Ps.- 
Phocylides, Sentences 67; Plutarch, Amatorius 751E; Ps.-Lucian, Affairs of the Heart 28.
116. Since translation o f  <kpoevoKonT|<; is its interpretation, I shall leave it untrans­
lated for now.
117. R. Scroggs, The New Testament and Homosexuality: Contextual Background for 
Contemporary Debate (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), pp. 40-42, 62-65,108. This interpre­
tation is anticipated by Origen (Fragmenta ex commentariis); text is C. Jenkins, “D ocu­
ments: The Commentary o f  Origen on I Corinthians,” Journal of Theological Studies 9-10  
(1908): 369.
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possible, however, if we put them in the context of Greco-Roman ethical re­
flection on the problem of &Kpdreia (lack of self-control) leading to OPpig 
(outrage) . 118
First, the issue of loss of self-control. Although paXaxd? frequently des­
ignated the sexually passive, penetrated male (and did so in a highly deroga­
tory way), we should not simply assume that this is the only way a first-cen­
tury audience could have made sense of the term . 119 Recent investigations of 
gender markers in the Roman world have emphasized that “softness” includes 
much more than the passive role in male/male sexual activity. 120 Even men 
who are too interested in having sex with women, their wives included, were 
deemed soft, as also were adulterers. 121 So too were males who used males.122 
It is therefore a legitimate question whether Paul’s first hearers would neces­
sarily have thought of the passive object of desire when hearing the word 
paXcxKdq, especially in a list of active deeds of injustice like theft, adultery, and 
the like listed in verses 9-10. Furthermore, vice lists similar to Paul’s which 
mention juaXaida do not condemn the male allowing himself to be sexually 
penetrated. Rather, they point more generally to the evils of excess or greed 
and lack of self-control. 123
118. CPpiC, as Fisher, p. 1, has amply docum ented, is m ore than an inner attitude; it 
“is essentially the serious assault on the honour o f  another, which is likely to cause shame.” 
For iippig mediated through the pleasures o f  the body, see Fisher, pp. 13-14,28-33,109-11.
119. For “soft” as a term o f  abuse which did its work by making a man (active/pene- 
trating) appear as a wom an (passive/penetrated), see M. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists 
and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 
58-81; Kennedy, pp. 31-34. For historical reconstruction o f  the men who chose to be pene­
trated by other m en and forced to bear this term o f  abuse, see Richlin, pp. 523-73. Richlin 
helps us understand the scorn com municated when this term was applied to the passive 
sexual partner.
120. The accusation o f  softness must be understood in a framework broader than 
sex. See C. Edwards, The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), pp. 68-78; Dean-Jones, p. 53.
121. Edwards, pp. 65, 75, 81-85, 93. In addition to the texts she cites, see Plutarch, 
On Moral Virtue 447B; Amatorius 750B.
122. Diodorus Siculus, Library of History 2.23.1-4. See Gleason, p. 42.
123. Epictetus, Discourse 2.16.45: ^iXapyupia, paXccxla, &Kpaaia. For this and sim i­
larly constructed lists, see Preston, pp. 10-11. Paul’s list typifies the male w ho cannot con­
trol his desires and who is, in Samuel Goldhill’s description o f  Longus’s portrayal o f  
Gnathon, “the negation o f  the sophron citizen” (Goldhill, p. 48). Cf. Lysis, Epistle to 
Hipparchus 4-5 (Thesleff, 113.8-16). Som e o f  the vices are reminiscent o f  parodies o f  the 
Greek sym posium  (e.g., Philo, On the Cherubim 91-93). Drunkenness especially needs to 
be understood as a m etonym y o f  the dissolute life. See Testament o f  Judah 16:1; Brown, 
p. 263. For softness related to avarice and drunkenness, see Edwards, pp. 85 n. 79,188-90.
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The association of pocXadoc with lack of self-control had a long history 
in ancient moral philosophy and widespread acceptance in the schools. Dis­
cussing the problem of self-restraint with respect to bodily pleasures (food 
and sex) , 124 Aristotle observes that “men are self-restrained (EYKpateTg) and 
enduring (rap rep iK o i), unrestrained (focparefo) and soft (paXotKoi), in regard 
to Pleasures and Pains.” 125 He goes on to connect puXatda with excess or lux­
ury, establishing a pattern of thought for future moralists. 126 This broad sense 
of paXaifoc; is the correct background for interpreting 1 Corinthians 6:9. This 
term, in association with “greedy ones” and “carousers,” communicates the 
notion of lack of self-control. The unjust (cxSikoi) who run the law courts are 
anything but the ideal of the temperate citizen who is able to pass out just 
judgments. Paul thus deconstructs the moral legitimacy of the elite who run 
the law courts.
So far we have considered the way the vice list speaks about lack of self- 
control. There is another moral dimension to the list, that of injustice and 
hybris, and it is against this background that we should understand the other 
term which figures so prominently in debates concerning Paul’s attitude to­
ward homosexuality: &paevoKonr|C- Translation of this term is a notorious 
problem not only because no occurrence before Paul has been discovered but 
also because such a lexical void tempts modern readers to import the cate­
gory of sexual orientation into the text. Another approach, which asserts that 
Hellenistic Judaism “under marked Levitical inspiration” coined the term, is 
able to provide only speculation as evidence. 127 That Paul invented the term 
himself is of course possible but not likely, since it occurs in a vice list whose 
rhetorical force would have relied on the language of moral failure already 
known to the audience. We are thus left with an examination of the word’s 
post-Pauline history. From this approach, we learn that dcpaevoKohris means 
“one who has a boy as an dpdpcvcx;.” 128 We also see that dtpcrevotcoma is
124. For the notion o f  “necessary pleasure,” see n. 48 above.
125. Aristotle, N ico m a ch ea n  E th ics 7.4.2. Cf. 7.4.4. For the continuation o f  juxtapos­
ing paXaida to pleasure and pain, see Stobaeus, A n th o lo g y  3.145.6-12; Glibert-Thirry, pp. 
265-67; Hippodamus, R e p u b lic  4 (Thesleff, 101.2-7); Theano, E pistle  1.1 (Thesleff, 196.7); 
Ps.-Crates, E pistles 19, 29; Ps.-Diogenes, E pistles  12, 29.2; 36.5.
126. Aristotle, N ic o m a c h e a n  E th ics 7 .7 A - 5 .  Cf. S to ic o ru m  V e te ru m  F ra g m en ta  
1.65.34-39; D io Chrysostom, D isco u rse  4.101-115; Seneca, E pistle  114; M usonius Rufus, 
F ragm en ts  1, 11, 46; Lucian, D ia lo g u es o f  th e D e a d  10.6.
127. D, Wright, “Homosexuals or Prostitutes? The Meaning o f  APEENOKOITAl 
(1 Cor 6:9, 1 Tim. 1:10),” VC 38 (1984): 138.
128. Hippolytus, R e fu ta tio  o m n iu m  h a ere siu m  5,26.22-23. Cf. Eusebius, P rep a ra tio  
eva n g elica  6.10.25.
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treated as an example of unjust, violent behavior of the person lacking self- 
control, and it has a hybristic intent. 129
It seems likely that with this term Paul is picking up a thread of Greek 
and Jewish tradition which regarded pederasty as an illegitimate form of 
erotic love not only because of the lover’s loss of self-control but also because 
of the younger male’s disgrace in being penetrated . 130 Stock arguments 
against the practice of pederasty turned inevitably to the iippig inflicted on 
the boy. 131 Vice lists like Paul’s often included violent, hybristic love of boys in 
association with other unjust acts, such as adultery, theft, slander, and 
avarice. 132
129. Wright (“Homosexuals or Prostitutes?”) fails to recognize the emphasis on  
h yb ris  in the texts that he cites to dispute Boswell’s claim for the m eaning o f  the term as ac­
tive male prostitutes. Furthermore, he distorts the ancient texts by assuming they speak o f  
the modern concept o f  homosexuality; for the problem o f  anachronism in Wright’s work, 
see W. Petersen (“Can APEENOKOITAi Be Translated by ‘H om osexuals’?” VC40 [1986]: 
187-91). For the association o f  dfpcsvoKorrrig with tapd rsta  anddSiKt'a, see 1 Tim. 1:8-11; 
A c ta  Joan n is  36.7; Theophilus o f Antioch, A d  A u to ly c u m  1.14; Eusebius, D e m o n s tr a tio  
evan gelica  1.6.67. For the explicit connection to uflpig, see Theophilus o f  Antioch, A d  
A u to lycu m  1.2.25. Macarius (H o m ilia e  sp ir itu a le s  49.5.6) treats dpaevoKOiria in Sodom  as 
a bold and reckless act (r6 Xpr|pa) against the angels. For the roXp- root in the condem na­
tion o f  male sexual designs on males, see Plato, L a w s  636C; Ps.-Dem osthenes, E ro ticu s  20; 
M usonius Rufus, F ra g m en t 12; Ps.-Lucian, A ffa irs  o f  th e  H e a r t  16. See further Preston, 
p. 29; Goldhill, p. 54.
130. For loss o f  self-control, see Gerhard, pp. 152-53. Recent scholarship has em ­
phasized the public disgrace o f  being penetrated. See Cohen, “Athenian Law o f  Hubris,” 
pp. 171-88; E. Fantham, “ S tu p ru m :  Public Attitudes and Penalties for Sexual Offenses in 
Republican Rome,” E chos d u  M o n d e  C la ssiq u e  35 (1991): 267-91; Richlin, pp. 561-66. For 
the h yb r is  inflicted upon the penetrated male, see Sibylline Oracles 3.180-187; 4.33; 
Dionysius o f  Halicarnassus, R o m a n  A n tiq u it ie s  16.4.1-3; G reek  A n th o lo g y  12.228. In the 
Greek ethical tradition, a distinction between “just love” and “love with ilppig” was often 
made. See Dover, G reek  H o m o sex u a lity , pp. 45-46; Brown, p. 116.
131. Plutarch, A m a to r iu s  768E; D io Chrysostom, D isc o u rse  7.149-152; Ps.-Lucian, 
A ffa irs  o f  th e  H e a r t  27; Achilles Tatius, L eu c ip p e  a n d  C lito p h o ti 2.37.3; Clement o f  Alexan­
dria, P aedagogu s  2.10.89.2. See Konstan, pp. 119-20.
132. Testament o f  Levi 17:11; Ps.-Phocylides, S en ten ces  3-6; Philo, S p ec ia l L a w s  
2.49-50; Ps.-Heraclitus, E pistle  7.3-8; Ps.-Hippocrates, E p istle  17.48; Clem ent o f  Alexan­
dria, P aedagogu s  3.12.89.1. See especially Epictetus, D isc o u rse  2.22.26-29: “For it is no  
judgement o f  human sort which makes them bite (that is revile [XoiSopeToOai]) one an­
other, and take to the desert (that is, to the market-place) as wild beasts take to the m oun­
tains, and in courts o f  law act the part o f  brigands; nor is it a judgem ent o f  human sort 
which makes them  profligates (ducparelg) and adulterers (poiyoug) and corrupters 





We have seen that in Romans 1:24-27 Paul borrows two things from the 
philosophic discourse on erotic love:
1. “natural use” as a standard for legitimate sexual practice, and
2 . a psychology of erotic love that makes intelligible the detrimental ef­
fects of passion.
An im portant consequence follows from this insight into the overlap o f Paul’s 
argument with the erotic discourse of his contemporaries. Neither the stan­
dard nor the psychology operates with the modern notions of sexual orienta­
tion and sexual relation. Therefore, it is anachronistic and inappropriate to 
think that Paul condemns homosexuality as unnatural and praises heterosex­
uality as a reflection of the God-given order of things. Sexual activity between 
males is not portrayed as the violation of a male-female norm  given with cre­
ation but as an example of passion into which God has handed over persons 
who have dishonored him. The immediate problem is passion, not the gender 
of the persons having sex. The argument of Romans 1:18-27 rests on the con­
ception familiar to Paul’s audience that passion itself is dishonorable. Simi­
larly, in 1 Corinthians 6:9 Paul draws from the philosophic tradition’s aver­
sion to passion. In this instance he uses the concept of softness to portray 
persons who lack self-control. He then mentions the figure of the hybristic 
pederast known in antiquity as one who through loss o f self-control demeans 
others. The moral issue is not sexual orientation but the connection between 
passion and injustice.
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